

THE ROCKEFELLER UNIVERSITY

pro bono humanis generis

1230 YORK AVENUE - NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10021-6399

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

April 7, 1988

Dr. R. C. Duncan
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Room 3E1006, Pentagon
Washington, D.C., 20301

DSB

Dear Dr. Duncan:

5 questions:

The tough ones are at the intersection of policy, strategy and technology. How to deal better with that intersection is, I guess, my main response. I won't tell you how the government should be reorganized (but see enclosure); but DSB might (eventually) be better reconstituted as a Science AND Policy Board. Even before that we should have (as DSB once did) more leavening of the Mil-Ind complex with more academically based and policy oriented folks.

Slightly more narrowly, my main anxiety is our dependence on capital ships that have to be amortized over a period of 40 years, during which it is certain that they will become ever more vulnerable, possibly even to 3d world forces. That proposition can be generalized to other major capital investments, but the Fleet stands out. We had better rethink Trident as well, with or without START.

As to technologies, the "brilliant, conventionally armed" repertoire of munitions, stipulated in "DD: Discriminate Deterrence" has to be converted from wish to reality. We have to be man-saving in our use of technology, make more use of autonomous vehicles in marine and land regimes as well as air.


"Strategic defenses" need to be depolarized, and brought back to a realistic framework of analysis and development. Again, we need a high level political decision before we can do the right technical job. What I've heard so far from Frank Carlucci is encouraging. We can't overlook cruise-missiles (eventually long range ones) as a major part of the threat.

DSB should play a substantial role in advising on post-START, and post-post-START strategic force structures. Bobby Inman's current panel on START verification is probably one of the most effective and most important DSB initiatives in recent history.

Some years ago, I had tried to promote: what would we do with onsite inspection if we ever had it; perhaps we'd be saving a lot of haste and hassle today if we had looked at that more thoroughly when there was ample time. I suggest we brainstorm what are the future comparable radical tangents that we can foresee now. DD and Andy Marshall's group on Future Strategic Environments have something to say on that.

DSB is still, I believe the most effective body of its kind in the government; yes, it might be even more so if it worked still more closely with SecDef, and as need arose with the National Security Adviser.

Yours sincerely,



Joshua Lederberg

Enc: CSAP announcement.